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1Debts on Debts
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of mortgages on consumer debt and on debt on durable goods.
We ﬁrst present a stylized model in which an outstanding debt, representing mortgages, aﬀects
positively consumer debt, and debt on durable goods. The model is empirically tested for the
U.S. using PSID 2005 wave. Our results are striking. First, we ﬁnd strong evidence supporting a
positive association between mortgage loans and consumer debts, regardless of the measures used,
the control variables used, and the methods used. Second, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of mortgages on
the debt on durable goods are in general smaller than the eﬀects of mortgages on consumer debt.
Third, our distributional analysis reveals that the eﬀects monotonically decrease as the quantile
increases. Finally, our results are also conﬁrmed by the results using the U.K. data.
Keywords: Consumer expenditure, Housing, Credit, Censored Regressions
JEL Codes: G21; E44; R21; R31
21. Introduction
The current ﬁnancial crisis in the U.S. has been one of the worst recessions since the
Great Depression.1 Policymakers and researchers alike have actively sought to understand
the causes of the current crisis. The sharp increase in household debt to unsustainable levels
during the period 2001 - 2007 before the recessions has been well-documented and found to
be one of the primary drivers of the current crisis, among other potential causes.2
Understanding why the level of household debt increased drastically is essential for the
understanding of the causes of the current ﬁnancial crisis.3 A potential explanation for the
increase in household indebtedness is related to housing wealth eﬀect, in which households are
allowed to borrow to ﬁnance their consumption against their home equity. The development
of ﬁnancial markets, by generating more credit and easier access to it, has increased the
demand for housing, and house ownership, in many countries.4 In the meantime, it has also
raised household debt and lead to the appreciation of house prices. More importantly, home
ownership and the increase in house prices allow households to have access to more credit; it
further increases their debt, although facilitating their consumption of durables (Muellbauer,
2007).
In the prior literature of permanent income hypothesis of consumption, the possibility of
1Estimates released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate that the real
GDP decreased at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
[http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm] The national unemploy-
ment rate rose to 9.7 percent in August, 2009 [http://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.nr0.htm].
2Mian and Suﬁ (2009) ﬁnd a strong link between the timing and the extent of severity of recessions and
the level of household leverage.
3Cox et al. (2002) and Aizcorbe et al. (2003) present descriptive analyses of household debt by type of
households in the UK and U.S., respectively [They draw upon Guiso et al. (1996)and Brown et al. (2005)
to specify the control variables in their econometric estimation]. Brown and Taylor (2008) investigate the
eﬀects on household debt of various household characteristics. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that the characteristics
of household heads such as gender, marital status, and employment status play important roles in household
indebtedness. However, the trend of population composition has been more or less stable in the past decade.
Without dramatic changes in population composition, these studies alone cannot help us understand the
causes of the sharp increase in household debt.
4According to Leamer (2007) housing has a larger impact on output than any other sector, and housing
is by far the best leading indicator of economic activity.
3any housing wealth eﬀect has been disregarded or minimized.5 However, when informational
problems are taken into account generating credit constraints, it is possible to show the exis-
tence of a housing wealth eﬀect. As argued by Aron and Muelbauer (2000) and Muellbauer
(2007), credit markets matter for the eﬀect of house prices on consumption through two
channels: (1) for ﬁrst-time buyers; and (2) for those already possessing housing collateral.
Potential ﬁrst-time buyers have to save a signiﬁcant fraction of their income for a housing
deposit. If credit markets develop improving the access to unsecured credit so as to reduce the
minimum down-payment as a fraction of the value of the house, or a rise in the maximum
loan-to-income ratio, it has the potential to make the young households to save less and
consume more (e.g. Japelli and Pagano, 1994; Engelhardt, 1996).
Credit development that allows home owners to obtain loans backed by housing equity
increases the liquidity of housing wealth and may have a large positive eﬀect on consumption
(e.g. Case et al., 2005; Carroll and Slacalek, 2006). It has the potential to be an explosive
process of debt formation, since households may have incentives, and channels, to accumulate
debt beyond their capacity to pay the principal and/or the interest due on outstanding debts.
In the Minskyan terminology this debt formation process has the potential to transform
households into Ponzi units (Minsky, 1986). The Ponzi-like debt formation process increases
the vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system and makes the occurrence of ﬁnancial crisis more
likely. Indeed, these two related channels are considered to be responsible for the sharp
increase in household debt during the period 2001-2007 (Mian and Suﬁ, 2009).
Extensive empirical studies have been devoted to assess the housing wealth eﬀects and
generally found evidence supporting its existence.6 These studies typically focus on the
5This also holds true for the general equilibrium macro-models based on the eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets
and rational expectations, as Benito et al. (2006).
6Muellbauer (2007) oﬀers the most complete and updated review of the literature. There is a large empiri-
cal literature assessing the impact of the housing wealth eﬀect [as a result of house price growth] on consump-
tion. Case et al. (2005) ﬁnd for the US and a panel of 14 countries, that the housing wealth eﬀect is larger
than the stock market wealth eﬀect (see also (Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud, 2004); (Carroll and Slacalek,
2006). (Calomiris et al., 2009) control for the possibility that both consumption and housing prices are
driven by changes in expected future income and contrary to Case et al. (2005) ﬁnd little eﬀect of housing
wealth on consumption. For UK micro data, Attanasio et al. (2009) express skepticism that a large housing
4level of consumption level, instead of the level of consumer debt. Therefore, while shedding
lights on the housing eﬀects on household’s consumption behavior, the literature does not
directly allow us to infer the housing eﬀects on household debt accumulation. Moreover,
consumption of durable goods and other types of consumption goods are not distinguished
in the literature. As we shall see below, there exist substantial diﬀerences in the eﬀects of
mortgage on the consumption of durable goods and other types of goods.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following important ways. First, the model
explicitly incorporates mortgage loans as a determinant of household’s debts. Second, we
complement the literature of house wealth eﬀects by directly looking at the ampliﬁed collat-
eral eﬀects on the level of consumer debts, rather than the level of consumption. This allows
for direct inference of housing eﬀects on debt accumulation. We also allow for diﬀerential
eﬀects of mortgages on diﬀerent types of consumer debts, by treating durable goods and
other consumption separately. Third, the empirical analysis relies on data at the household
level (discussed below); it allows us to control for a rich set of household characteristics,
enabling more plausible interpretation of causal relation between consumer debt and mort-
gage. As noted in Cox et al. (2002), analyses of aggregate data do not allow us to look
at which household accumulate more debts. Finally, we tackle the issue whether debts-on-
debts exist for all consumers, by assessing the eﬀects of mortgage on consumer debt within a
distributional framework. This approach uncovers any heterogeneity in the magnitude and
existence of the eﬀects across the distribution of consumer debt. The analysis sheds light on
the debts-on-debts process, and it is useful for sound policymaking.
To perform the analysis, we ﬁrst present a stylized theoretical model capturing the pro-
cess of consumer debt formation from house ownership, in which debt generates debt. Home
ownership is generally associated with mortgages, which is an outstanding debt. If a home
owner, who is a debt holder, is allowed to have more credit, because the owned home rep-
wealth eﬀect exists, while Campbell and Cocco (2007) ﬁnd that the largest house price eﬀects are for the
older homeowners. For the US micro data Lehnert (2004) also ﬁnds the largest house price eﬀects are for
the older homeowners.
5resents better collateral than other assets, this may allow her to increase her debt through
the ﬁnanced consumption of durable goods. Our model characterizes this process of debt
formation in which debt facilitates and grows with debt. As a result, consumer debt and
the demand for durable goods are positively related to mortgage payments, suggesting that
mortgage holders have greater access to credit and facility to ﬁnance their durable goods
expenditures, increasing their indebtedness.
Utilizing data from the 2005 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the U.S., we em-
pirically test our theoretical model, using both parametric and semi-parametric approaches.
The results are striking, yielding three main conclusions. First, we ﬁnd strong evidence
supporting a positive association between mortgage loans and consumer debts, regardless of
measures used, the control variables used, and the methods used. Second, we ﬁnd that the
eﬀects of mortgages on the debt on durable goods are in general smaller than the eﬀects of
mortgages on other types of debts. Third, our distributional analysis reveals an interesting
pattern of the eﬀects on consumer debt of mortgage over the distribution. Speciﬁcally, the
eﬀects monotonically decrease as the quantile increase, with the smallest eﬀects being at the
upper tail of the distribution. Finally, to further assess the robustness of our results, we also
utilize the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Wave 15 (2005). Our results are also
conﬁrmed by the results using the U.K. data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a stylized theo-
retical model; sections 3 and 4 details the econometric method and data; sections 5 and 6
presents the baseline and robustness results, respectively; and, section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Model
Our stylized model is a partial equilibrium model with one representative consumer that
may accumulate debt in a deterministic environment and supplies labor inelastically. The







˙ B = c + D(1 − α(r)) + r(B + θM + α(r)D) + θM − y (2)
˙ D = f(α(r)D,B,θM,y) (3)
Where δ is the positive rate of time preference, c is consumption of nondurables, D is
the stock of durable goods, y is labor income, B is debt, M is mortgage payments, f is
expenditures on durable goods,α is the share of durable goods that are ﬁnanced, r is the real
interest rate and θ is a parameter that indicates whether the consumer owns a house [θ = 1]
or not [θ = 0]. We assume that the share of expenditures on durable goods is a negative
function of r, αr < 0. As in Gal´ ı (1993) we assume separable preferences between c and
D, and that the stock of durable goods is adjusted through expenditures on durable goods,
given by (3).
The expenditures on durable goods, given by the function f in (3), are an increasing
function of mortgage payments M, fM > 0, reﬂecting the assumption that home owners
have easier access to credit, and labor income, y, fy > 0. We assume that expenditures
on durable goods are a negative function of the stock of durable goods, D, fD < 0 and
increasing function of outstanding debt, B, fB > 0.
The dynamic budget constraint in equation (2) assumes, diﬀerently from Iacoviello (2005),
that there are no changes in holdings of housing7, which according to Calomiris et al. (2009)
characterizes most homeowners, which own roughly what they intend to consume in housing
services. This allows us to eliminate the real housing price from the budget constraint, so
as that the housing wealth eﬀect plays no role in our analysis. So in the dynamic budget
7See Mishkin (2007) discussion of user cost of residential capital
7constraint the household can accumulate debt, which increases with expenditures on durable
goods [ﬁnanced or not] and monthly mortgage payments, in the case where the household
owns a house.
The Hamiltonian function of the consumer problem is:
H = U(c)+F(D)+λ[c+D(1−α(r))+r(B+θM +α(r)D)+θM −y]+ f(α(r)D,B,θM,y)
where λ and   are the co-state variables for debt (B) and stock of durable goods (D),
respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions of the representative agent problem are:
U
′(c) + λ = 0 (4)
˙ λ − λδ = −[λr +  fB(α(r)D,B,θM,y)] (5)
˙   −  δ = −[F
′(D) + λ(α(r)(r − 1)) +  fD(α(r)D,B,θM,y)] (6)
Plus the transversality conditions. In the above model Equations (2)-(6) determine ﬁve
endogenous variables, c, B, D, λ, and  .
This model has multiple equilibria, however we conﬁne our analysis to the case where δ,
the positive rate of time preference is equal to the real interest rate, r. Assuming δ = r, the
steady state equilibrium, denoted by an asterisk over the variables [c∗,D∗,B∗],is:
˙ D = 0 =⇒ f(α(r)D
∗,B
∗,θM,y) = 0 (7)
˙ λ = 0 =⇒ fB(α(r)D
∗,B
∗,θM,y) = 0 (8)
˙ B = 0 =⇒ c
∗ = y − D
∗(1 − α(r)) − r(B
∗ + θM + α(r)D
∗) − θM (9)
Equations (7) and (8) determine simultaneously the steady state equilibrium values of
demand for durable goods, D∗, and consumer debt, B∗, and then Equation (9) determines
the equilibrium value of consumption of nondurables, c∗. Notice that in (8) we assume that
  is diﬀerent from zero in equilibrium. Equations (7) and (8) depend on the expenditure
8function f and its derivative with respect to B. These equations show that equilibrium
consumer debt and equilibrium consumption of nondurables are related to each other since
they are determined simultaneously and are aﬀected by the same set of variables, the real
interest rate r, mortgage payments M, and labor income y.
The focus of this model is to assess the impact of mortgage payments, M, on the equi-
librium demand for durable goods and on consumer debt. In order to obtain the multipliers
from the comparative statics analysis assume that fBB < 0;fBM > 0;fBD = 0. The main
results of the model are presented in the following propositions:








Proposition 2 As −fMfBB > 0 > −fBfBM, mortgage payments have a positive impact







Of course mortgage payments only aﬀect the households who own a house, θ = 1. Notice
that mortgage payments may have a either larger or smaller impact on the equilibrium
demand for consumer debt than on the equilibrium demand for durable goods.
3. Empirical Methodology
3.1. Parametric Approach
Notice that (observed) household debt can take only on nonnegative values, and that
there exists a signiﬁcant fraction of households possessing no debts. A linear model of
consumer debt, ln(yi), might be a good approximation of the underlying conditional expec-
9tation function E[ln(yi)|x1,...,xk] only when xi near the mean values (Wooldridge, 2008);
it may underestimate the eﬀects otherwise. Following Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002)
and Brown and Taylor (2008), we therefore estimate the following Tobit model to test our
theoretical predictions:
ln(y




where ln(y) is observed household debt, either consumer debt or debt on durable goods;
ln(y′) is the untruncated latent household debt, which in principle can take on negative
values; M is mortgage payments; X is a vector of controls (including a constant); and ǫ is
the error term as usual, normally distributed with mean zero and constant homoskedastic
variance σ2. We can now restate our theoretical predictions in light of Equations (12) and
(13). Both Propositions 1 and 2 imply that β1 > 0.
Prior to continuing, a few comments are warranted regarding the model assumptions.
First, the causal interpretation of the eﬀects of mortgage payment on other household debt
hinges on the assumption of conditional exogeneity or selection-on-observables (termed as in
the literature of treatment eﬀects, see Heckman and Robb, 1985). This assumption requires
that conditioning on observable characteristics, mortgage payment is not correlated with
the error term (other unobservable determinants of consumer debt). As noticed above, our
theoretical model suggests that consumer debt and durable goods both are interrelated and
endogenously determined by all other variables including income and mortgage payments.
It is not diﬃcult to imagine that, in an extended model in which mortgage payment is
also endogenously determined, all three types of debts would be functions of a same set of
exogenous variables. This presents a great challenge to any empirical studies of this type,
as it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd an exogenous instrument variable that determine mortgage payment
but are uncorrelated with consumer debt; any instrument variables proposed could thus be
10controversial. Like most of the literature on housing wealth eﬀects, while we are not able to
ﬁnd a valid instrument variable, we are able to include a rich set of household characteristics
in our estimation. The richness of covariates in PSID makes the assumption of ”selection-
observable” reasonably plausible.
Second, the Tobit model also relies crucially on the assumption that the error term
is normally distributed, with zero mean and homoskedastic variance. Viloations of the
assumptions could potentially lead to inconsistent estimates of β1, but the magnitude of the
bias will depend on the severity of the voliation. As noted in Wooldridge (2008, p.594),
moderate departures from homoskedasticity and normality may still allow the Tobit model
to provide good estimates of β1. In order to assess the validity of the assumptions, we
utilize both informal and formal approaches. Wooldridge (2008) proposes an informal way
to evaluate the appropriateness of the Tobit model by estimating a probit model where
the dependent variable equals one if ln(y) > 0, and zero otherwise. Notice that, if the
assumptions of Tobit model hold, the coeﬃcients of ln(M),X obtained from this probit
model, denoted βprobit, are equivalent to the Tobit coeﬃcients divided by the estimate of
σ, denoted βtobit/σ. Thus, the closeness between βprobit and βtobit/σ indicate whether or
not the assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity are indeed reasonable. In addition
to the informal approach, we also implement conditional moment tests of normality and
homoskedasticity (see,Skeels and Vella, 1997, and Drukker, 2002).
3.2. Semi-parametric Approach: CLAD, SCLS, and Censored Quantile Regression
In addition to the Tobit model, we employ two alternative semi-parametric estima-
tion methods under weaker assumptions – censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) and
symmetrically-censored least squares (SCLS) methods.8 These methods are robust to the
presence of non-normal and heteroscedastic disturbances and thus allow us to further assess
the sensitivity of the Tobit estimates to the relaxation of the assumptions of normality and
8Interested readers are referred to Chay and Powell (2001) for an excellent summary of these methods
11homoskedasticity. CLAD is proposed by Powerll (1984) and SCLS Powerll (1986). As noted
in Chay and Powell (2001), both methods are involved with two alternating steps: regression
step and recensoring step; the algorithm is as follows:
1. Use certain estimation technique to obtain initial estimates of β1,β2 (regression step)
2. Generate predicted values   ln(y) based on the estimates
3. Drop the observations if the predicted values do not meet the preset criterion. (recen-
soring step)
4. Repeat (1) – (3) using the remaining sample until the preset criterion is met. The last
set of estimates is our estimates of β1,β2.
The regression step of SCLS is based on ordinary least square (OLS) estimation; while
the regression step of CLAD is based on the least absolute deviation (LAD) estimation which





{τI[ui ≥ 0] + (1 − τ)I[ui < 0]}|ui| (14)
where I[.] is the indicator function, equal to 1 if u ≥ 0, zero otherwise; τ is the quantile,
here, τ = .5 and u = ln(y) − β1ln(M) − Xβ2.
The recentering step of SCLS is based on symmetric trimming; the values ln(y) > 2  ln(y)
are replaced by 2  ln(y) and then the observations with ln(y) < 0 are dropped. The recentering
step of CLAD, on the other hand, keeps only the observations with   ln(y) ≥ 0.9
Notice that the logic of CLAD can be easily extended to estimate the eﬀects across
the whole distribution by setting diﬀerent values of τ ∈ (0,1); we denote this censored
quantile regression estimation (see Conley and Galenson (1994, 1998) for some interesting
applications of censored quantile regression). Censored quantile regression approach allows
9As noted in Li and Racine (2007), CLAD estimator could potentially break down in the cases of heaving
censoring. In the situations where there exists a signiﬁcant fraction of zeros, we randomly drop part of the
observations with zeros to get CLAD started; in this sense, we may think that we are estimating an eﬀect
at a higher quantile than reported.
12us to obtain estimates of β1 at each quantile τ, thereby obtaining a much more complete
picture of the eﬀects of mortgage payments on consumer debt at diﬀerent portions of the
distribution of consumer debt.
In sum, we employ both parametric (Tobit) and semi-parametric (CLAD and SCLS)
approaches to test our theoretical predictions. Moreover, we assess the predictions within a
distributional framework using censored quantile regression.
4. Data
The data are obtained from Panel Studies of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID con-
tains a longitudinal sample of “a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women,
and children) and the family units in which they reside”.10 We utilize the 2005 wave (the
more recent sample before the crisis started.) to form a sample of 7,500 households.
The variables of main interest are mortgage payments, debt on durable goods, and other
type of consumption goods. We use two measures of mortgage payments to assess the ro-
bustness of our results. The ﬁrst one is total remaining principal on all mortgages, and the
second one is total monthly mortgage payments. The debt on durable goods is correspond-
ingly measured by the total loan for vehicles and total monthly payment for all vehicles.
Similarly, the debt on other type of debts is measured by total amount of any other debts
such as credit card charges and student loans and total monthly payment for these debts.
As we mentioned above, PSID provides rich information on household characteristics.
In order to make the assumption of selection-on-observables more plausible as well as to
increase the precision of estimates, we include a rich set of individual, household, and geo-
graphic characteristics in our estimation. Inclusion of the household heads’ characteristics
is particularly important, as they might capture their preferences, personal ﬁnancial knowl-
edge, income constraints, and so on. Moreover, our speciﬁcation of the additional covariates
10PSID is publicly available at http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/. See PSID documentation for a
complete description
13is similar to that in Brown and Taylor (2008) and Guiso et al. (1996, 2003), which facilitates
the comparison with the existing literature on debt formation. Speciﬁcally, we include a
set of dummy variables for age of household head (aged 16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-60,
and aged 60 and above); dummy variables for education level of household head (below
high school, high school, and college and above); a dummy variable indicating the gender
of household head, equal to one if male, zero otherwise; a dummy variable indicating the
current marital status of household head, equal to one if currently married, zero otherwise; a
dummy variable indicating the race of household head, equal to one if white, zero otherwise;
the number of children residing in the household; a dummy variable indicating whether or
not the household head is currently employed; and a dummy variable indicating whether or
not household head’s health status is good.11 Moreover, we also include dummy variables
for regions. Table (A1) presents the summary statistics.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline Results
We begin by reporting OLS results in Table (1). Columns (1) and (2) are the results for
the total loans on durable goods and other types of debts, respectively; Columns (3) and (4)
are the results for the monthly payment on durable goods and other types of debts, respec-
tively. This gives a basis for future comparisons. We control for the variables discussed above
in the data section. The OLS results show a large, positive eﬀect of mortgage payment on
11This variable is corresponding to the question: Would you (HEAD) say your health in general is excellent,








(1)-(3) are coded to one; (4)-(5) zero; and the rest missing values.
14consumer debts across all four speciﬁcations. The elasticities of consumer debts with respect
to mortgage payment range from 6.3 percent to roughly 13 percent. All these estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant at p ≤ 0.001. These results appear to be strongly consistent with our
theoretical prediction: consumer debts grow with mortgage payment.
While of interest, OLS does not take into account the censoring issue and may thus fail
to produce consistent estimates of the eﬀects of mortgage payment on consumer debts. We
therefore turn to our Tobit results. These results in Table (2) are the marginal eﬀects on
the observable debts (i.e.
∂E[ln(y)]
∂xj ) evaluated at the means. The elasticity of total debt on
durable goods with respect to mortgage payment is .063 (s.e. = 0.01), whereas the elasticity
of total debt on other types of consumption goods with respect to mortgage payment is 0.128
(s.e. = 0.012); the former is larger than its OLS counterpart, and the latter is smaller than
its comparable OLS result. Similarly, the housing eﬀects is .051 on monthly payment on
durable goods and .140 on monthly payment on other debts. The Tobit results conﬁrm the
OLS estimates, pointing to a positive association between mortgage payment and consumer
debts. Moreover, the housing eﬀect on other types of consumer debt is at least twice as large
as the housing eﬀect on durable goods, regardless of the measures used.
The results for other variables are broadly consistent with the literature. Several ﬁndings
are worth noting. First, age proﬁle has a signiﬁcant, both economically and statistically,
impact on the level of consumer debt. In particular, younger cohorts (aged 16-34) accumulate
more debts on both durable goods and other consumption goods, relative to the older cohorts.
Such a result may reﬂect that young individuals who are in the beginning of their careers may
in general have greater needs for consumption goods but have less resources of their own, and
that they thus need to seek external resources to ﬁnance their consumption. Second, race also
plays an important role in determining household indebtedness across all four speciﬁcations.
A white household head is more likely to have at least 20% more consumer debts than a
household head from other ethnic groups. This ﬁnding is consonant with the ﬁndings in
Duca and Rosenthal (1993), suggesting that white families may have greater access to credit
15and are less credit constrained than minorities. Third, as in Brown and Taylor (2008), we
ﬁnd that being employed is positively associated with household debts, regardless of the
measures used. Finally, it is evident that some characteristics have diﬀerent impacts on car
loans and other types of debts. For example, being married with a spouse increases the
debts on durable goods, but is uncorrelated with other debts. This ﬁnding highlights the
importance in distinguishing between two measures.
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis
As noted above, for the Tobit estimates to be consistent, the error term has to be normally
distributed with homoskedastic variance. To assess these requirements, we provide results
from several speciﬁcation tests (the conditional moment tests), as well as the results from
the informal approach proposed in Wooldridge (2008), in Tables (3) and (4). The ﬁrst
panel in Table (3) display the test of normality. P-values based on asymptotic distributions
are in parentheses. Asymptotic inference could, however, lead to severe size distortions
(Skeels and Vella, 1997). We also implement a parametric bootstrap method proposed by
Drukker (2002) to correct the size distortion; corresponding critical values are presented
beneath the asymptotic p-values. We easily reject the null of normally distributed error
term at p ≤ 0.05 level across all four speciﬁcations. The test of homoskedasticity presented
in the second panel in Table (3) also leads to a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of
homoskedastic variance (p ≤ 0.01) in all speciﬁcations.
Table (4) presents the results for the informal test proposed in Wooldridge (2008). The
idea is that, if the departure from these assumption is not substantial, the estimates from
the probit model, where the dependent variable equals one if ln(y) > 0 and zero otherwise,
ought to be similar to the coeﬃcients from the Tobit model divided by the estimates of
σ. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd some discrepancies between these two models. For example, the
probit coeﬃcient βprobit of being in a household with total household income between 25th-
50th percentile is twice as large as the coeﬃcient constructed from the Tobit model βtobit/σ.
However, for most variables, the coeﬃcients from these two models are close to each other; it
16implies that, although the assumptions are not certainly satisﬁed, the departure from these
assumptions may not be severe.
We now turn to the results for CLAD and SCLS estimation. To facilitate the compari-
son, we also present the Tobit coeﬃcients comparable to CLAD and SCLS results in Table
(5). These coeﬃcients are the elasticities of latent consumer debt with respect to mortgage
payments,i.e.
∂E[ln(y′)]
∂xj . The estimates for other covariates are similar and thus omitted, but
available from authors upon request. Examination of the results yields two ﬁndings. First,
the eﬀects of mortgage payment on consumer debt drop considerably, with the large decrease
being about .16 percentage points (Tobit model v.s. CLAD model in the ﬁrst column); the
discrepancies between Tobit and two semi-parametric models are, as expected, consistent
with the results of speciﬁcation tests. Second, in spite of diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients, the
qualitative conclusion remains unchanged. We again ﬁnd that there exists a large, positive
impact of mortgage payment on consumer debt across all four speciﬁcations. For example,
an increase of one percentage point in monthly mortgage loan is associated with an increase
of nineteen percentage points in monthly payment on other debts. Moreover, we continue to
ﬁnd that the eﬀects of mortgage payment on other debts are larger than those on car loans.
As discussed above, we are concerned with extremely high level of consumer debts.
Thus, we report the results for the censored quantile regression at selective quantiles (τ =
.60,.65,.70,.75,.80,.85), controlling for the same set of covariates discussed above, in Table
(6). In parenthesis are bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications. These re-
sults allow us to ask how diﬀerent the eﬀects of mortgage payment are on consumer debts
at diﬀerent quantile. Two ﬁndings stand out. First, we again ﬁnd that mortgage payment
is positively associated with consumer debts at every quantile, regardless of measures used.
In addition, the eﬀects of mortgage payments on other debts are always larger than those
on debts on durable goods at every quantile. Second, the elasticities of consumer debts
with respect to mortgage payment a monotonically decrease monotonically as the quantile
increases. And the decrease is particularly large for other debts. In particular, the estimates
17decrease from .086 to .034 for total debts on other types of consumption goods.
In sum, while both semi-parametric and distributional results indicate that the Tobit
estimates tend to overestimate the association between mortgage payment and consumer
debts, the qualitative conclusion from the Tobit estimates remain unchanged.
5.3. International Evidence
To further assess the robustness of our results, we also utilize the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS), Wave 15 (2005). While also providing rich information on household
characteristics, many of which are comparable to PSID, BHIP does not ask the respondents
of actual amount of other loans; instead it asks whether or not a respondent has any loans
for a speciﬁc type. That is, we can estimate only the eﬀects of mortgage payment payments
on the propensity to having more debts. Here, we use two measures of consumer debts:
one is whether one has any car loan and the other whether one has any other types of
debts. These are binary variables, and thus we estimate the eﬀects of mortgage payment via
probit model estimation. The marginal eﬀects of mortgage payment evaluated at means are
reported in Table (7) for both U.S. and U.K.. Two things are noteworthy. First, the eﬀects
remain positive and are statistically signiﬁcant. However, relative to the U.S. results, the
UK estimates are generally very small. This actually suggests that while the debts-on-debts
process exists in the U.K. as well, the eﬀects are less severe. Second, we again ﬁnd that
the eﬀects of mortgage payment on other types of debts are in general larger than those on
durable goods, in line with the U.S. results.
6. Conclusion
The existing empirical studies of the determinants of household debts typically focus on
the eﬀects of household characteristics on household indebtedness and fail to distinguish
diﬀerent types of debts and to investigate the interrelationship among them. On the other
hand, the existing literature on housing wealth eﬀects has extensively studied the potential
link between housing values or mortgage on household’s consumption level, instead of debt
18on consumption goods. Moreover, these empirical studies are in general limited to regression
analysis. Such results at best provide evidence of average eﬀects of mortgage.
This paper sets out to bring together these two strands of literature, investigating the
impact of mortgages on consumer debt and on debt on durable goods. Moreover, we comple-
ment the existing literature by employing censored quantile regression approach; this method
allows us to look beyond the average eﬀects and thus to provide a more complete picture
of the eﬀects of mortgages on diﬀerent types of household debts. The analysis herein yields
three main conclusions. First, we ﬁnd strong evidence supporting a positive association
between mortgage loans and consumer debts, regardless of the measures used, the control
variables used, and the methods used. Second, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of mortgages on the
debt on durable goods are in general smaller than the eﬀects of mortgages on other types of
debts. Third, our distributional analysis reveals an interesting pattern of the eﬀects on con-
sumer debt of mortgage over the distribution. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀects decrease monotonically
as the quantile increase, with the smallest eﬀects being in the upper tail of the distribution.
While these ﬁndings are striking, future research is necessary to further assess the robust-
ness of our results. As discussed above, while we are able to include a rich set of covariates
in our estimation, there could still be unobservable determinants of consumer debts and
debts on durable goods are correlated with mortgage payment. How robust are the results
to the relaxation of the assumption of “selection-on-observables”? The question remains
open, and answering such a question is important for a deeper understanding of the process
of household debt formation.
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23Table 1: OLS Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts) ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts)





Age of head of household 1.442*** 2.256*** 0.822*** 1.669***
16 - 24 years (0.221) (0.226) (0.124) (0.162)
Age of head of household 1.388*** 2.820*** 0.861*** 2.129***
25 - 34 years (0.179) (0.182) (0.1) (0.131)
Age of head of household 0.562** 1.848*** 0.352*** 1.400***
35 - 44 years (0.184) (0.19) (0.101) (0.136)
Age of head of household 0.765*** 1.475*** 0.472*** 1.098***
45 - 54 years (0.172) (0.177) (0.095) (0.126)
Age of head of household 0.430* 1.329*** 0.229 1.015***
55 - 60 years (0.214) (0.214) (0.119) (0.154)
Total household income -2.127*** -0.362 -1.230*** -0.409**
0-25th percentile (0.192) (0.193) (0.11) (0.14)
Total household income -0.987*** 0.089 -0.662*** -0.052
25-50th percentile (0.176) (0.164) (0.101) (0.119)
Total household income -0.183 0.544*** -0.197* 0.309**
50-75th percentile (0.167) (0.149) (0.096) (0.108)
Education Level 2 0.152 0.532** 0.082 0.384**
(0.173) (0.18) (0.095) (0.126)
Education Level 3 -0.023 1.760*** -0.015 1.272***
(0.183) (0.189) (0.102) (0.134)
Region 2 0.306 -0.199 0.207* -0.132
(0.164) (0.161) (0.094) (0.117)
Region 3 0.704*** -0.224 0.460*** -0.177
(0.156) (0.153) (0.089) (0.111)
Region 4 0.146 -0.405* 0.12 -0.298*
(0.18) (0.175) (0.102) (0.126)
Married 0.791*** 0.005 0.454*** 0.009
(0.126) (0.119) (0.071) (0.086)
White 0.2 0.394*** 0.237*** 0.296***
(0.115) (0.113) (0.064) (0.081)
No. of Children 0.051 -0.159*** 0.052 -0.120***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.028) (0.034)
Currently Employed 0.810*** 0.603*** 0.465*** 0.384***
(0.13) (0.141) (0.071) (0.102)
Health Status -0.157 -0.414** -0.085 -0.334***
(0.135) (0.137) (0.074) (0.098)
Constant 1.237*** 1.115*** 0.541** 0.896***
(0.298) (0.301) (0.167) (0.217)
No. of Obs 7604 7481 7677 7735
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
2 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** signiﬁcant at 1% level;** signiﬁcant at 5% level;*
signiﬁcant at 10% level;
24Table 2: Tobit Model (Marginal Eﬀects Evaluated at Mean)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts) ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts)





Age of head of household 2.512*** 3.209*** 1.442*** 2.362***
16 - 24 years (0.418) (0.362) (0.247) (0.261)
Age of head of household 1.885*** 3.606*** 1.124*** 2.692***
25 - 34 years (0.273) (0.269) (0.16) (0.193)
Age of head of household 0.922*** 2.430*** 0.549*** 1.817***
35 - 44 years (0.253) (0.268) (0.145) (0.191)
Age of head of household 1.191*** 2.034*** 0.710*** 1.501***
45 - 54 years (0.246) (0.247) (0.142) (0.176)
Age of head of household 0.869** 1.912*** 0.491** 1.444***
55 - 60 years (0.286) (0.301) (0.164) (0.216)
Total household income -1.998*** -0.379 -1.111*** -0.407**
0-25th percentile (0.139) (0.21) (0.076) (0.147)
Total household income -0.645*** 0.219 -0.417*** 0.059
25-50th percentile (0.142) (0.184) (0.077) (0.129)
Total household income -0.068 0.660*** -0.087 0.401***
50-75th percentile (0.134) (0.166) (0.073) (0.117)
Education Level 2 0.258 0.944*** 0.153 0.687***
(0.237) (0.255) (0.135) (0.181)
Education Level 3 0.12 2.219*** 0.082 1.592***
(0.238) (0.254) (0.135) (0.18)
Region 2 0.305 -0.23 0.188 -0.152
(0.176) (0.179) (0.101) (0.129)
Region 3 0.727*** -0.24 0.450*** -0.188
(0.165) (0.172) (0.093) (0.123)
Region 4 0.195 -0.376* 0.142 -0.272*
(0.186) (0.187) (0.106) (0.134)
Married 0.789*** -0.023 0.446*** -0.016
(0.122) (0.136) (0.068) (0.096)
White 0.264* 0.436*** 0.236*** 0.327***
(0.114) (0.125) (0.063) (0.089)
No. of Children 0.063 -0.160** 0.053* -0.119**
(0.048) (0.054) (0.027) (0.038)
Currently Employed 0.997*** 0.793*** 0.555*** 0.524***
(0.134) (0.155) (0.075) (0.111)
Health Status -0.125 -0.489** -0.054 -0.393**
(0.161) (0.174) (0.09) (0.124)
N. of Obs 7604 7481 7677 7735
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
2 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** signiﬁcant at 1% level;** signiﬁcant at 5% level;*
signiﬁcant at 10% level;
3 Marginal Eﬀects
∂E[ln(y)|ln(M),X]
∂xj are evaluated at the mean.
25Table 3: Speciﬁcation Tests of Normality and Homoskedasticity Assumptions of Tobit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts) ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts)
(Annual) (Annual) (Monthly) (Monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Test of Normality
Test Statistic 2048.313 4213.098 2083 3828.944
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
7.336 7.003 6.669 7.215
Test of Homoskedasticity
Test Statistic 5488.287 6492.9 5892.421 6160.425
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
2 P-values are in parentheses. All the standard errors and critical values are based on 500 boot-
straps.
26Table 4: Informal Tests of Normality and Homoskedasticity Assumptions of Tobit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
βtobit/σ βprobit βtobit/σ βprobit βtobit/σ βprobit βtobit/σ βprobit
ln(Mortgage) 0.018 0.021 0.03 0.035 0.027 0.03 0.045 0.052
Age of head of household 0.566 0.614 0.639 0.656 0.577 0.61 0.647 0.656
16 - 24 years
Age of head of household 0.476 0.529 0.746 0.776 0.505 0.542 0.766 0.782
25 - 34 years
Age of head of household 0.248 0.261 0.516 0.504 0.265 0.271 0.532 0.51
35 - 44 years
Age of head of household 0.315 0.337 0.438 0.425 0.336 0.348 0.446 0.429
45 - 54 years
Age of head of household 0.228 0.235 0.401 0.377 0.232 0.232 0.417 0.387
55 - 60 years
Total household income -0.706 -0.693 -0.089 -0.031 -0.72 -0.711 -0.133 -0.07
0-25th percentile
Total household income -0.199 -0.198 0.05 0.108 -0.237 -0.235 0.019 0.085
25-50th percentile
Total household income -0.02 -0.017 0.149 0.214 -0.047 -0.035 0.126 0.193
50-75th percentile
Education Level 2 0.075 0.076 0.216 0.206 0.08 0.084 0.218 0.21
Education Level 3 0.035 0.03 0.514 0.52 0.044 0.04 0.51 0.506
Region 2 0.087 0.106 -0.054 -0.061 0.097 0.11 -0.049 -0.056
Region 3 0.208 0.229 -0.056 -0.063 0.233 0.245 -0.06 -0.069
Region 4 0.056 0.056 -0.089 -0.104 0.073 0.073 -0.089 -0.1
Married 0.23 0.244 -0.005 -0.022 0.236 0.252 -0.005 -0.025
White 0.078 0.102 0.102 0.129 0.127 0.141 0.106 0.136
No. of Children 0.018 0.023 -0.037 -0.042 0.028 0.03 -0.038 -0.044
Currently Employed 0.318 0.332 0.189 0.205 0.322 0.328 0.173 0.192
Health Status -0.036 -0.042 -0.111 -0.117 -0.028 -0.034 -0.123 -0.129
Constant -1.212 -1.387 -0.767 -1.039 -1.358 -1.5 -0.739 -0.987
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
27Table 5: Tobit, CLAD and SCLS Models (Coeﬃcients)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts) ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts)
(Total) (Total) (Monthly) (Monthly)
Tobit Model 0.205*** 0.215*** 0.184*** 0.238***
(0.034) (0.02) (0.034) (0.023)
CLAD Model 0.046*** 0.142*** 0.036** 0.199***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.018) (0.033)
SCLS Model 0.087** 0.137** 0.065** 0.144**
(0.029) (0.02) (0.03) (0.024)
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
2 Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors for Tobit models are robust
standard errors.All the standard errors for CLAD and SCLS models are based on 500
bootstraps. *** signiﬁcant at 1% level;** signiﬁcant at 5% level;* signiﬁcant at 10%
level;
28Table 6: Censored Quantile Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts) ln(Car Loan) ln(Other Debts)
(Total) (Total) (Monthly) (Monthly)
α = .60 0.037*** 0.086*** 0.024** 0.136***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.01) (0.021)
α = .65 0.032*** 0.072*** 0.023*** 0.124***
(0.006) (0.01) (0.007) (0.016)
α = .70 0.025*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.107***
(0.005) (0.01) (0.006) (0.013)
α = .75 0.02*** 0.056*** 0.017*** 0.084***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)
α = .80 0.015*** 0.044*** 0.017*** 0.069***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
α = .85 0.011** 0.034*** 0.012** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
2 All the standard errors are based on 500 bootstraps. *** signiﬁcant at 1%
level;** signiﬁcant at 5% level;* signiﬁcant at 10% level;
29Table 7: International Comparison: Probit Models (Marginal Eﬀects evaluated at mean)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Any Car Loan Any Other Debts Any Car Loan Any Other Debts
(Total) (Total) (Monthly) (Monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4)





N. of Obs 7604 7481 7875 7735





N. of Obs 10708 12839 10708 12839
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics and British Household Panel Survey, Wave 2005.
2 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** signiﬁcant at 1% level;** signiﬁcant at 5%
level;* signiﬁcant at 10% level;
30Table A1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
ln(Car Loan) 40062.52 195863.4 7947
(Total)
ln(Other Debts) 7988.88 34624.45 7803
(Total)
ln(Car Loan) 120.84 449.95 7748
(Monthly)
ln(Other Debts) 665.74 2885.37 7803
(Monthly)
ln(Mortgage) 51784.42 93243.99 7668
(Total)
ln(Mortgage) 1631.2 11081.01 7947
(Monthly)
Age of head of household 0.08 0.26 7947
16 - 24 years
Age of head of household 0.23 0.42 7947
25 - 34 years
Age of head of household 0.22 0.41 7947
35 - 44 years
Age of head of household 0.22 0.42 7947
45 - 54 years
Age of head of household 0.09 0.28 7947
55 - 60 years
Age of head of household 0.16 0.37 7947
60 and above years
Total household income 0.25 0.43 7947
0-25th percentile
Total household income 0.25 0.43 7947
25-50th percentile
Total household income 0.25 0.43 7947
50-75th percentile
Total household income 0.25 0.43 7947
75th and above percentile
Education Level 1 0.08 0.26 7947
Education Level 2 0.43 0.49 7947
Education Level 3 0.5 0.5 7947
Northeast 0.14 0.34 7947
North Central 0.25 0.43 7947
South 0.43 0.5 7947
West 0.18 0.39 7947
Married 0.5 0.5 7946
White 0.61 0.49 7889
No. of Children 0.86 1.16 7947
Currently Employed 0.75 0.44 7940
Health Status 0.83 0.38 7909
1 Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Wave 2005.
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